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Negotiating the Treaty of Rome
on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court*
M. Cherif Bassiouni**
I. Preparing the Draft Statute
From 1995 to 1998, the United Nations General Assembly convened two
committees to produce what was called a "consolidated text' of the Draft
Statute for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC).
2
The Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court (Ad Hoc Committee) met throughout 1995 to discuss major substan-
* Portions of this article derive from M. Cherif Bassiouni, Historical Survey: 1919-
1998, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999).
** Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute,
DePaul University College of Law; President, International Association of Penal Law;
President, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences. The author
was the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Rome Diplomatic Conference; Vice-
Chairman of the 1996-98 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court (PrepCom); and Vice-Chairman of the 1995 Ad Hoc
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.
1. See United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the Establishment of an Inter-
national Criminal Court, G.A. Res. 51/207, U.N. Doc. A/51/627 (1996) [hereinafter G.A.
Res. 51/207], reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVATIONS AND
ISSUES BEFORE THE 1997-98 PREPARATORY COMMITTEE; AND ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL
IMPLICATIONS 1, 13 Novelles ttudes P~nales (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1997) [hereinafter
13 NEP]. The resolution recalls the General Assembly's decision to establish a prepara-
tory committee "to discuss further the major substantive and administrative issues arising
out of the draft statute prepared by the International Law Commission, and taking in
account the different views expressed during the meetings, to draft texts, with a view to
preparing a widely acceptable consolidated text. .. ." Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Stat-
ute]. Both committees worked at the United Nations headquarters in New York. See
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
G.A., 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995), reprinted in THE STATUTE Of
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999)
[hereinafter THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT]; Report of the Preparatory Com-
mittee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Vols. I & II, G.A., 51st
Sess., Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996), reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT, supra. This compilation also contains the April 1998 draft statute pre-
pared by the PrepCom, the final text of the Statute, and a historical background. For a
commentary on the work of the PrepCom, see 13 NEP, supra note 1; OBSRRVATIONS ON
THE CONSOLIDATED ICC TEXT BEFORE THE FINAL SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE,
13bis NOUVELLES ETUDES PtNALES (Leila Sadat Wexler, special ed., M. Cherif Bassiouni,
general ed., 1998) [hereinafter 13bis NEP].
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tive and administrative issues,3 but did not engage in negotiations or draft-
ing. In 1996, the Ad Hoc Committee was replaced by the Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 4
(PrepCom), which met through 1998. During its first year, the PrepCom
also did not draft provisions of the Draft Statute because several States
were not ready to proceed to the drafting stage. Indeed, a number of major
states, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and China, ini-
tially felt that the PrepCom, like the Ad Hoc Committee, should only dis-
cuss issues until the political climate matured enough to allow the process
to move into the drafting stage.5
Had the PrepCom continued to merely discuss issues throughout
1997, it would not have been able to complete the Draft Statute by the April
3, 1998 deadline,6 and the Rome Diplomatic Conference (the Conference)
due to startJune 15, 1998, would have had to have been postponed. While
some governments would have welcomed a postponement, most govern-
ments did not want the Conference to be delayed. Ambassador Adriaan
Bos, an experienced Dutch diplomat who was the Chairman of the Ad Hoc
Committee and the PrepCom, was sensitive to these concerns and cau-
tiously moved forward. By 1997, the PrepCom had produced only an
unstructured and substantially unusable compilation of all governmental
proposals. 7 To remedy the situation, an inter-sessional meeting of the
Bureau8 and the coordinators of the different parts9 was held at Zutphen,
The Netherlands, January 19-30, 1998. That meeting provided some struc-
ture and streamlining for the compilation of the proposed texts. Even so,
what emerged remained essentially a cumbersome accumulation of alter-
native governmental proposals requiring additional technical work and
more extensive negotiations, particularly with regard to fundamental issues
such as the definition of crimes, the nature of the ICC's jurisdictional
mechanisms, and complementarity, which remained in the early stages of
negotiation.
The work at Zutphen and the diligence of the coordinators at the last
PrepCom session (March-April 1998) allowed the completion of the Draft
Statute and Draft Final Act on April 3, 1998. However, due to the time it
took to have the working text translated from English into the other official
3. See supra note 1, at 1.
4. G.A. Res. 50/46, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/46 (1995).
5. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Observations Concerning the 1997-98 Preparatory Com-
mittee's Work, in 13 NEP, supra note 2, at 5-36.
6. The PrepCom's mandate from the General Assembly ended on April 3, 1998.
See supra note 4.
7. Many delegates jokingly referred to this compilation of proposals as the "tele-
phone book."
8. The Bureau consisted of the Chairman, Vice-Chairperson, and the Rapporteur.
9. The Chairman appointed a number of delegates to be "coordinators" or informal
chairs of working groups which met formally and informally to draft text for the differ-
ent parts of the Statute, e.g., Procedure, Jurisdictional Mechanisms, Crimes, Criminal
Responsibility, Cooperation and Enforcement, etc. In the end, the Statute adopted in
Rome contained 12 Parts.
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languages, 10 the Member States in New York did not receive it until the end
of April. This left only six weeks for the text to make its way from the
Member States in New York to their respective foreign affairs ministries,
and then to their justice and, in some cases, defense ministries." Thus, by
the time the text reached those officials who later joined their governments'
delegations in Rome, they had little time to study and assess the Draft Stat-
ute or to obtain specific instructions for the Conference from their
superiors.
The length of the Draft Statute further complicated the delegates' task:
it was 173 pages and consisted of 116 articles with some 1300 brackets for
optional provisions and word choices.12 Working with such a text was dif-
ficult even for those who participated in the Ad Hoc Committee and the
PrepCom, let alone for those delegates who were unfamiliar with it.
While the Ad Hoc Committee and the PrepCom met in New York from
1995-98, the ICC was largely ignored by the governments, media, and gen-
eral public in most Member-States. For most states, the advent of the ICC
seemed too remote to be a matter for domestic political debate. However,
whenever debate existed, it was typically limited to foreign affairs special-
ists, human rights organizations, and a few academics. Neither official cir-
cles nor the general population in most states were adequately informed
about the proposed Court. The lack of information created considerable
uncertainty in the capitols, which in turn hampered negotiations in both
New York and Rome. The absence of public debate on the ICC still persists
in most countries, including those that voted in support of the Confer-
ence's Final Act or signed the Rome Treaty.13 This has made the subse-
10. The official languages are Arabic, Chinese, French, English, Russian, and
Spanish.
11. In Rome, many justice ministries' representatives complained that their foreign
affairs ministries had not communicated with them on the ICC until the last minute, so
that they did not have sufficient time to prepare for the Conference. Also, many Member
States only involved their foreign affairs ministries and did not include justice or defense
ministries.
12. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Draft Statute and Draft Final Act, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/2/Add.1 (1998),
reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INEMATIONAL COURT, supra note 2, at 119-210.
13. One hundred twenty states voted in support of the Conference's Final Act. See
UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with Decision to Establish Permanent Inter-
national Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release L/ROM/22 (17 July 1998). As of October
20, 1999, 89 states had signed the Rome Treaty and four have ratified it: Albania,
Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangla-
desh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada,
Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, C6te d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Eritrea, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Geor-
gia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy (rati-
fied), Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Namibia, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Samoa, San Marino (ratified), Saint Lucia, Senegal (ratified), Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slo-
venia, the Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Trini-
dad and Tobago (ratified), Uganda, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the
United Kingdom, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See Rome Statute of the Interna-
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quent ratification process that much more difficult.
II. Preparing for the Conference
Approximately two-thirds of the Conference delegates had not participated
in the Ad Hoc Committee or the PrepCom, and as noted above, most of the
delegates either did not have the time to study the text or had studied it
superficially. Consequently, the delegates needed a learning curve period,
which slowed the negotiations. Fearing that the Conference might resem-
ble the first meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee, particularly in light of the
Conference's relatively short five-week duration,
14 the PrepCom's Bureau 15
decided to hold an organizational meeting before the Conference began.
However, convening a pre-Conference organizational meeting posed an
unusual problem - no one had authority to convene a formal meeting.
The PrepCom's Bureau and working groups coordinators had no official
capacity after April 3, 1998, when the PrepCom ended.16 The nominated
Conference chairpersons, in turn, had no legal capacity prior to their for-
mal election on June 15, 1998. The pragmatic solution, wisely proposed
by the United Kingdom, was to have an informal meeting of the nominated
chairpersons and whomever they wished to include as prospective coor-
dinators of the Conference's working groups.
That solution still left the problem of who would convene the meeting
and how it would be funded. The International Institute of Higher Studies
in Criminal Sciences (ISISC), a non-governmental organization (NGO)
with a special cooperation agreement with the United Nations,17 offered to
assume responsibility for organizing and funding the meeting in coopera-
tion with another NGO, the International Scientific and Advisory Profes-
tional Criminal Court, Ratification Status (last modified Oct. 20, 1999) <http://
www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm>.
14. While it may appear that five weeks is a long time, officially there were only 24
working days of six hours a day. Within that period the delegates had to discuss and
draft 116 articles, which entailed compromising on the definitions of crimes, on the
scope of the ICC's jurisdiction and triggering mechanisms, on the role of the Security
Council and the Prosecutor, and on other unresolved political issues. The participation
of 161 delegations with an estimated 2000 delegates (out of the 5000 registered ones)
compounded the difficulty of achieving consensus in such a limited period of time.
15. The Bureau members were Adriaan Bos, Chairman; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Sylvia
Fernandez de Gurmendi, and Marek Madej, who resigned and was replaced by Peter
Tomka, Vice-Chairpersons; and Juan Yoshida, Rapporteur, who resigned and was
replaced by Masataka Okano. See THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note
2, at 115.
16. See G.A. Res. 51/207, supra note 1.
17. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sci-
ences, in THE CONTRIBUTIONS Of SPECIALIZED INSTITUTES AND NoN-GovERNMENTAL ORGANI-
ZATIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS CRIMINAL JUsTIcE PROGRAM: IN HONOR OF ADOLFO BERIA
DI ARGENTINE 209 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1995) [hereinafter CONTRIBUTIONS OF SPECIAL-
IZED INSTITUTES]. The ISISC had already hosted several informal meetings of the
PrepCom's working groups in Siracusa. See THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT,
supra note 2, at 24.
1999 Negotiating the Treaty of Rome
sional Council (ISPAC).' 8 The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also
supported the initiative and agreed to eventually refund the organizers for
the meeting costs. The outgoing PrepCom agreed to this informal arrange-
ment, and the meeting took place May 4-8, 1998, in Courmayeur, Italy.
The Courmayeur meeting was attended by the three Conference chair nom-
inees,19 the coordinators of the PrepCom working groups, the designated
U.N. Executive Secretary of the Conference, 20 members of the U.N. Secreta-
riat, and officials of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Courmayeur participants discussed the organizational plan for
the Conference's work, developed a strategy for the order in which the vari-
ous parts of the Draft Statute would be discussed, and planned the work
flow between the three official conference bodies - the Committee of the
Whole, the Working Group, and the Drafting Committee.2 1 The
Courmayeur participants also decided that the Conference's Plenary ini-
18. See Ernesto Ugo Savona, International Scientific and Advisory Professional Coun-
cil, in ComN-IBUtmONS OF SPECIALZED INSTITUTES, supra note 17, at 249.
19. The Conference chair nominees were Professor Giovanni Conso of Italy, Ambas-
sador Adriaan Bos of the Netherlands, and Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni of Egypt. See
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, Draft Rules of Procedure, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/2/Add.2 (1998), reprinted in THE
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note 2, at 211-19.
20. Mr. Roy Lee, Director, Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs.
21. The duties of these bodies are set forth in the PrepCom's Draft Organization of
Work, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/CRP.21 (1998), which provides as follows:
1. As mandated by the General Assembly in its resolution 52/160, of 15
December 1997, the task of the Conference is to finalize and adopt a con-
vention on the establishment of an international criminal court. The Con-
ference should move promptly to the consideration of substantive matters
after a short session on organizational matters.
2. After the opening of the Conference by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, the Conference will meet to elect the President, adopt the agenda
and the rules of procedure and elect other officers.
3. The General Committee will meet immediately following the election of its
members. Its work will include, inter alia, assisting the President in the
general conduct of business and making recommendations with respect to
the election of members of the Drafting Committee.
4. The plenary, on the recommendations of the General Committee will then
elect the members of the Drafting Committee and adopt the programme of
work of the Conference.
5. The plenary will then proceed to hear statements from States in accord-
ance with an established list of speakers prepared on a first-come-first-
served basis. The Conference will also hear statements from a limited
number of intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organi-
zations. The list of speakers will be opened for inscription on 15 April
1998.
6. With a view to the efficient and expeditious discharge of the work of the
plenary, a time limit may be established for statements by States on the
one hand (e.g., 10 minutes) and intergovernmental organizations and non-
governmental organizations on the other. In principle, States should be
given more time than intergovernmental organizations and non-govern-
mental organizations. A total of eight meetings may be allotted for this
purpose.
7. The Committee of the Whole should concentrate on the substantive work
and should begin its work on 16 June. It may hold up to four meetings
(with full interpretation) per day throughout the Conference, i.e., two bod-
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tially would convene only during the first week of the Conference to allow
delegation heads to make their speeches and then again for a final session
to formally vote on the Conference's Final Act.22 They also decided that
the Committee of the Whole, the Working Group, and the Drafting Com-
mittee would start their meetings on June 17, while the delegation heads
were still presenting speeches at the Plenary. They also agreed that Parts 1
and 3 of the Draft Statute would be the first sections to be discussed by the
Committee of the Whole and the Working Group since these parts were
more likely to be accepted than other parts of the Draft Statute. Parts 1 and
3 would then be sent to the Drafting Committee for completion. This strat-
egy aimed to create a positive momentum that would help accelerate the
drafting process.
Shortly after the Courmayeur meeting, however, Ambassador Adriaan
Bos, Chairman designate of the Committee of the Whole, underwent emer-
gency surgery, and therefore could not assume his chair responsibilities in
Rome. At Bos' suggestion, Ambassador Philippe Kirsch of Canada was
elected as his replacement. A skilled and decisive diplomat, Kirsch proved
most effective at the Conference. His success is particularly impressive
given that he was representing his government before the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) that May and was able to arrive in Rome only two
days before the Conference started.
On June 14, Kirsch met with the other designated Conference
chairs,23 the PrepCom's working group coordinators, the U.N. Secretariat
staff, representatives of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Sec-
retary General's Representative, Hans Corell, to review the Courmayeur
plan. Kirsch accepted the plan and judiciously reappointed the PrepCom
coordinators as Conference coordinators for the same topics. But he also
foresaw that the time allotted for the discussions of the various parts of the
Draft Statute needed to be more flexible. Kirsch urged everyone to push
negotiations and curtail speech-making, and requested the coordinators to
develop rolling texts to advance the process.
ies may meet concurrently, both morning and afternoon. The Committee
of the Whole will report to the plenary upon the completion of its work.
8. A working group of the Committee of the Whole will begin its work on the
afternoon of 17 June.
9. The Drafting Committee moy begin its work on 19 June; two meetings
(with full interpretation) per day may be allotted to it throughout the Con-
ference. The Drafting Committee will receive its work from the Committee
of the Whole and report to it. Time constraints might make it necessary to
allow the Drafting Committee to report on the last portion of its work
directly to the plenary.
10. The Credentials Committee will meet sometime during the second or third
week of the Conference. One meeting has been allotted for that purpose.
11. The last day of the Conference is reserved for the signature of the Final Act
and of the Statute of the Court and for the closure of the Conference.
22. To maximize limited time, delegation heads were each given five to seven minutes
for their opening remarks; IGOs (and some NGOs) were given three to five minutes.
23. Giovanni Conso of Italy and M. Cherif Bassiouni of Egypt. See supra note 19.
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Unfortunately, when the Committee of the Whole met on June 17, it
immediately became clear that they could not maintain the Courmayeur
schedule due to the number of unprepared delegates. Thus, the Committee
of the Whole and the Working Group became bogged down in the same
discussions that the Ad Hoc Committee and the PrepCom had previously
undertaken. For the veterans of the process it was a disappointing brush
with d~ja vu.
IU. The Rome Conference
After the first week of the Rome Conference, the number of delegates
(many of whom had come only for the initial ceremonies) shrank from
about 5000 to approximately 2000.24 The remaining attendees fell into
two categories: those with some knowledge of the Draft Statute's text,
either from their previous participation in the Ad Hoc Committee or the
PrepCom or from their own study; and those who had little or no knowl-
edge of the text. The former, who constituted only about one-tenth of the
delegates, were optimistic; the latter were not, and they initially expressed
concerns and raised questions that had been previously debated (and in
some cases even settled) by the PrepCom. With this difficult beginning, it
seemed unlikely that the Conference would have a promising outcome. By
the second week, some delegates started to speculate about the need for a
second Diplomatic Conference, or Rome II.
This situation made the first two weeks of the Conference very pessi-
mistic. To speed the pace of the discussions, Kirsch instituted several infor-
mal working groups, which ultimately broke down into smaller informal-
informal working groups. At times, there were as many as a dozen of these
groups convening simultaneously. In addition, delegations consulted one
another, and met with regional and political groups. 25 As a result of these
multiple meetings, most delegates worked ten to twelve hours a day, and
those who assumed leading roles worked even longer hours. Given the hec-
tic pace and grueling nature of the work, the delegates' mood became
increasingly pessimistic during the ensuing weeks of the Conference.
Worst of all, there were few effective negotiations on the Statute's difficult
provisions (which are customarily left to the end of most negotiating
processes).
26
The formation of smaller working groups and the extensive work
schedule weighed most heavily on the smaller delegations, some of which
24. See Fanny Benedetti & John L. Washburn, Drafting the International Criminal
Court Treaty: Two Years to Rome and an Afterward on the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 5
GLOBAL GovERNANcE 1, 16 (Jan.-Mar. 1999) (noting that the remaining delegates con-
sisted of career U.N. diplomats, senior civil servants, public and private experts, and
politicians).
25. The Arab States formed one of the most active informal groups; they met fre-
quently and adopted common positions that were not necessarily supportive of the ICC,
although some states (such as Egypt and Jordan) were part of the "like-minded states."
The "like-minded states" met most frequently and were the driving force for completing
the Draft Statute and for establishing the ICC.
26. See infra notes 45-48, 61-64 and accompanying text.
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consisted of only two or three delegates and who consequently could not
attend all these concurrent meetings.27 The non-English-speaking delega-
tions suffered the most, since the informal working groups conducted their
meetings exclusively in English due to the unavailability of simultaneous
interpretation. 28 Nevertheless, the informal working groups accelerated
the process, even though only a few of the 2000 delegates grasped the over-
all progress of the work.
To make matters worse, the headquarters building of the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), where the Confer-
ence was held, was not conducive to having multiple meetings.29 Meetings
of the various working groups were scattered throughout some 100 rooms
and frequently had to be arranged on an ad hoc basis. Except for the three
permanent meeting rooms of the Committee of the Whole, the Working
Group, and the Drafting Committee (the last of which met in the remote
Malaysia Room 30 ), the rooms in which the informal working groups met
often changed, frequently without adequate notice, so that the delegates
had to rush about to locate their meetings on a daily basis. The FAO build-
ing, a relic of the Mussolini-era architectural style, was, to say the least,
confusing. Its three different horizontal wings were connected by vertical
corridors, which did not correspond to the same floors, and delegates fre-
quently lost their way from one meeting room to another.
31
27. Delegations with 10 or more members could adequately cover all of the proceed-
ings, but smaller delegations could not. The pressure on the Secretariat, however, was
even more intense. For example, as more informal meetings were held over the course of
the Conference, the understaffed Secretariat became desperate for assistance and began
using its law student interns to staff the informal discussions.
28. Personnel constraints, logistics, and costs prohibited simultaneous interpreta-
tion into the six official languages. This placed delegates from non-English-speaking
countries at a disadvantage and barred those delegations with limited English language
ability from effective participation.
29. For example, participants were often confused as to the location and time of
their meetings since the monitor placed in the main lobby of the building did not reflect
updates or changes in meeting times and places. Also, a general shortage of computers
available to conference delegates encumbered the distribution of proposals. Moreover,
the Secretariat quickly became overwhelmed with the volume of documents that
required translation and distribution among the delegates. Many other difficulties were
compounded by the inadequate facilities for communicating to individuals outside of
the conference. The hundreds of conference attendees waited in long lines for the six
phones and two fax machines available for general use.
30. The Malaysia Room, named for the Government that had donated its furnish-
ings, was in Building C on the second floor. It was far removed from the first floor
rooms of the Committee of the Whole and the NGO quarters (the Sudan Room), which
were in Building A. Thus, most delegates and NGOs did not even know where the Draft-
ing Committee met, let alone what it accomplished. This gave the Drafting Committee
an aura of mystery and remoteness, but it also meant that its efforts were not as appreci-
ated as they should have been. Nevertheless, this anonymity allowed the Drafting Com-
mittee-to work effectively and in complete confidentiality, particularly since the media
was oblivious to its existence and thus to its work. Even the daily NGO bulletin, Terra
Viva, referred to the Drafting Committee only once in five weeks.
31. Finding U.N. staff offices was another difficult endeavor. Further, air condition-
ing existed in only a few of the rooms, with the balance of the building and the corridors
subject to one of Rome's hottest and more humid summers.
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IV. The Flow of Texts to the Drafting Committee
While the breakdown into informal working groups quickened the drafting
process, it also resulted in a piecemeal treatment of the Statute's articles.
Each day, the Drafting Committee3 2 received only a few complete articles
and an average of ten to fifteen paragraphs of disparate articles from the
Committee of the Whole.3 3 Furthermore, the Drafting Committee often
received different parts of a given article over a two to three week period.
3 4
Formulating the Draft Statute thus resembled the assembly of a large jig-
32. Twenty-five elected delegations formed the Drafting Committee: Cameroon,
China, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Leba-
non, Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Feder-
ation, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, the Syrian Arab Republic, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela. The members of these delegations
were not always the same throughout the five weeks. Since there was no official roster of
delegates representing these delegations, the following names are those that the author
recorded, though other delegates also occasionally participated. Thus, the following list
is incomplete: Cameroon: Maurice Kamto, Victor Tchatchouwo; China: Xu Hong; the
Dominican Republic: Christina Aguiar; Egypt: M. Cherif Bassiouni; France: Frangois
Alabrune, Pierre-AndrE Lageze; Germany: Hans-Joerg Behrens; Ghana: Immanuel Akwei
Addo; India: S. Rama Rao; the Republic of Korea: Sung-Kyu Lee; Lebanon: Hicham
Hamdan; Jamaica: Wayne McCook, Cheryl Thompson-Barrow; Mexico: Socorro
Rovirosa, Jorge Palacios Trevifio, Luis Fernandez Doblado; Morocco: Amal Belcaid, Fakhr
Eddine Essaaidi; the Philippines: Antonio Morales, Jose Tomas Syquia; Poland: Maria D.
Frankowska, Kirill G. Gevorgyan; the Russian Federation: Alexei Dronov; Slovenia:
Mirjam Skrk; South Africa: Sabelo Sivuyile Maqungo; Spain: Juan Antonio Yaiiez-
Barnuevo, Julio Montesino Ramos; Sudan: Awad EI-Hassan EI-Noor, Abdalla Ahmed
Mahdi; Switzerland: Lucius Caflisch, Jfirg Lindenmann; the Syrian Arab Republic:
Mohammad Said A1-Bounni; the United Kingdom: Susan Dickson, Franklin Berman; the
United States: Clifton Johnson, Michele Klein Solomon, Jamison S. Borek; and Vene-
zuela: Victor Rodriguez Cedefio, Milagros C. Betancourt, Norman L. Monagas.
33. The working groups submitted draft provisions directly to the Committee of the
Whole for its pro forma approval. After the Committee of the Whole considered each
new provision, it labeled the additions "rolling text" and placed them aside pending
receipt of the remainder of articles in which they belonged. Once the Committee had
received a given article in full, the Secretariat would prepare a separate document and
assign it a conference symbol number; the text would then be translated and distributed
to the Drafting Committee for review. Once the Drafting Committee had the opportu-
nity to discuss the portions of each article, it labeled the article "text adopted on first
reading." The Drafting Committee would then await the remaining parts of the Draft
Statute to determine whether the language for an individual article was consistent with
the rest of the parts. Once that was accomplished, the Drafting Committee would label
the article "text adopted on second reading." The Drafting Committee reported to the
Committee of the Whole when it completed an entire part of the Draft Statute.
34. The Committee of the Whole began transmitting articles to the Drafting Com-
mittee on June 19, 1998, and continued to transmit articles until July 15, 1998. During
this four week period, the Drafting Committee received 35 articles in two to nine differ-
ent parts. The specifics are as follows: Article 3 (in 3 parts); Article 4 (in 3 parts);
Article 24 (in 2 parts); Article 29 (in 3 parts); Article 31 (in 9 parts); Article 35 (in 4
parts); Article 37 (in 9 parts); Article 39 (in 4 parts); Article 40 (in 3 parts); Article 43
(in 9 parts); Article 45 (in 4 parts); Article 49 (in 6 parts); Article 52 (in 3 parts); Article
54 (in 9 parts); Article 58 (in 6 parts); Article 61 (in 9 parts); Article 67 (in 2 parts);
Article 68 (in 7 parts); Article 69 (in 8 parts); Article 71 (in 2 parts); Article 72 (in 2
parts); Article 74 (in 3 parts); Article 75 (in 2 parts); Article 77 (in 3 parts); Article 80
(in 5 parts); Article 81 (in 3 parts); Article 82 (in 5 parts); Article 83 (in 4 parts); Article
86 (in 7 parts); Article 87 (in 3 parts); Article 90 (in 9 parts); Article 91 (in 5 parts);
Article 94 (in 2 parts); Article 99 (in 3 parts); and Article 102 (in 2 parts).
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saw puzzle: the Committee had to determine how all the pieces - the sepa-
rate articles or paragraphs received in this manner - fit together. The
disparity in languages, legal approaches, and drafting techniques among
the various working groups further complicated the drafting process. The
piecemeal transmission process also caused the Drafting Committee signif-
icant difficulties in maintaining a consistent form and style, in ensuring
the uniform usage of terms, and in providing cross-references to other
related articles. 35 As a result of these difficulties, most articles required
several revisions before they were finalized. 36 Perhaps the Drafting Com-
mittee's most difficult and time-consuming task was to work in six lan-
guages simultaneously and to do its own corrections on most of the
translated articles. Consequently, the twenty-five delegations serving on
the Drafting Committee were heavily burdened.37
On the third day of the Drafting Committee's work, it was discovered
that most of the translating was done in New York and Geneva, requiring
the U.N. staff to send the texts and receive the translations via e-mail. This
process meant that different translators worked on different articles and
more frequently on different paragraphs of a given article, and that resulted
in a lack of consistency in the translation. As Chairman of the Drafting
Committee, I called upon the Committee members' good will and support
to tackle this problem and asked the delegations to rearrange their seating
order according to linguistic affinity, instead of by alphabetical order by
country name, which is U.N. protocol. 38 The linguistic groups worked
together and reviewed translated text in their respective languages, and
then compared translations in order to ensure that they reflected the same
meaning.39 For all practical purposes, the Drafting Committee took on
35. Cross-referencing was almost an impossible task as article numbers changed
daily with the addition of new paragraphs.
36. Rule 49 of the Conference, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court, Draft Rules of Procedure, supra note 19, provided
that the Drafting Committee would not deal with substantive issues. However, the rule
was relaxed during the third and fourth weeks when the working groups, eager to move
on at a faster pace, became more reliant on the Drafting Committee to undertake more
substantive drafting. However, this meant that the Drafting Committee needed more
time to consult with the working groups' coordinators to clarify the intent of the draft
articles on which they were working. To assist the Drafting Committee, the Committee
of the Whole referred various articles with notes representing its understanding of the
transmitted articles. The notes also alerted the Drafting Committee to particular textual
issues, such as term selection or identified terms that should not be changed.
37. Even though drafting is a rigorous process that requires much concentration, the
Drafting Committee frequently worked 10 to 14 hours a day. The U.N. Secretariat
worked almost around the clock for the last three days of the Conference.
38. This approach brought together delegates whose national positions were diverse
and helped focus their attention on the text, while diminishing the psychological impli-
cations of adhering only to nationalistic positions.
39. We usually started by clarifying the meaning of a certain concept or term in
English and then determining its equivalent or counterpart in the major legal systems
represented within the Committee. At times, we were unable to reconcile different legal
concepts because they were worded in carefully chosen diplomatic terms. Nevertheless,
whenever we encountered a troublesome provision, we alerted the relevant working-
group coordinator and tried to clarify the ambiguities. On several occasions we success-
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both translation and review responsibilities. This in itself was unprece-
dented in multilateral treaty processes, but it was indispensable. U.N.
reviewers then examined the translations, followed by the Drafting Com-
mittee's final review.40 Nevertheless, despite the assiduous efforts of the
U.N. reviewers and the Drafting Committee, the text still contained some
technical errors. As a result, the Secretariat had to resort to a no-objection
procedure 41 in order to make some material (but non-substantial)
corrections.
42
The members of the Drafting Committee worked extraordinarily well
in an unsurpassed spirit of friendly cooperation. Notwithstanding the
many difficulties and pressures described above, the Committee completed
all 111 articles of the draft text on July 15. Except for Part 2 (Articles 5-
21)4 3 and certain Final Clauses,44 the Committee of the Whole swiftly
approved the draft text.
On the afternoon ofJuly 16, the Drafting Committee received Part 2 of
the Draft Statute (Articles 5-21) from the Bureau with the instructions that
the text could be read but not altered. The Drafting Committee unani-
mously refused to accept this restraint. Most members felt that the
Bureau's instructions violated the spirit if not the letter of the Conference's
Rules.45 If the Drafting Committee had been able to review Part 2, it could
have resolved certain problem that surfaced later. For example, Article
12(3) refers to acceptance of the ICC's jurisdiction using the terms "with
respect to the crime in question."46 That terminology could imply that a
non-State Party could select the crimes for which it would accept the
fully reconciled conflicts, but where the working group had selected the terms deliber-
ately (i.e., as a result of lengthy negotiations), we could not alter the provision.
40. Because of the volume of the texts and time constraints, the translations con-
tained some errors. The United Nations released a set of corrections on November 10,
1998, and on July 12, 1999.
41. The no-objection procedure, which requires unanimity, is based on Article 79 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Several multi-lateral conventions
have resorted to no-objection procedures, which are essentially designed to correct non-
substantive errors such as typographic punctuation and cross-referencing errors. The
U.N. Secretariat communicates suggested corrections to the Member States; if the States
make no objections, then the corrections are deemed accepted.
42. The Secretariat released a set of corrections based on the no-objection procedure
in October 1998. See U.N. Doc. C.N./577.1998 Treaties-8 (1998).
43. Part 2, which contains Articles 5-21, addresses the ICC's jurisdictional authority
and the applicable law to be applied in defining the elements of crimes. See also infra
notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
44. The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole presented several of the Final
Clauses to that Committee on behalf of the Bureau on the last day of the Conference.
See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text; see also Philippe Kirsch &John T. Holmes,
The Rome Diplomatic Conference on an International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Pro-
cess, 93 AM. J. lThr'L L. 2 (1999). Surprisingly, an article by Malnoush H. Arsanjani, the
Secretary of the Committee of the Whole, makes no reference to the Drafting Committee.
See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM.
J. INr'L L. 22 (1999).
45. See supra note 19. Several delegations questioned the procedural validity of sub-
mitting a text on a take it or leave it basis when only some delegations had participated
in its preparation.
46. Article 12(3) provides:
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Court's exercise of jurisdiction and, conversely, prevent jurisdiction for a
crime it wished to exclude. The intended meaning of Article 12(3) is that
the Court could exercise its jurisdiction with respect to any crime referred
to in Article 5 arising out of a "situation" which is referred to it. The term
"situation" is used for a referral to the Court by a State Party or by the
Security Council pursuant to Article 13.
4 7
Other drafting problems have also subsequently surfaced. For exam-
ple, both Articles 27(2) and 98(1) concern immunity. This could poten-
tially foster inconsistent interpretation of the Statute's immunity
provisions. To avoid future interpretation problems, the content of these
two Articles should have been joined.
The Statute's omission of the material elements of crimes, or actus
reus, creates another problem area. During the Conference, an article
defining actus reus was dropped from the Statute because some delegations
could not agree on its content. However, until the last moment, the Draft-
ing Committee expected to receive such a provision. Lacking a provision
on the elements of crimes, the Court will have to determine what consti-
tutes an act or omission by analogy to national legal systems. However,
Article 22(2) specifically excludes interpretation by analogy. Furthermore,
Article 22(2)'s prohibition of interpretation by analogy also conflicts with
Article 31(3), which allows the Court to develop other grounds for exclu-
siori from criminal responsibility.
Finally, there is no valid methodological explanation for the separa-
tion and placement of the provision concerning the presumption of inno-
cence (Article 66) in Part 6 and the provisions concerning ne bis idem
(Article 20) and applicable law (Article 21) in Part 2. All of these provi-
sions properly belong in Part 3 of the Statute, which deals with general
principles of criminal responsibility.48
If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under
paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question. The
accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception in
accordance with Part 9.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12(3) (emphasis added).
47. Article 13 (emphasis added):
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in
accordance with the provisions of this statute if:
(a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been com-
mitted is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with arti-
cle 14;
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been com-
mitted is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in
accordance with article 15.
Id. art. 5 (emphasis added).
48. While Articles 20 and 21 were included in Part 2 as a result of political consider-
ations, the location of Article 66 in Part 6 reflects an insufficient appreciation of tradi-
tional legal methods of criminal law.
Vol. 32
1999 Negotiating the Treaty of Rome
V. The Negotiating Process
The delegates at the Conference did not begin negotiating with a blank
slate; instead, they built upon the efforts of the Ad Hoc Committee and the
PrepCom. 49 During the meetings of these Committees, as well as the three
inter-sessional meetings at the ISISC in Siracusa, Italy, and the Zutphen
meeting,50 the delegates of certain active governments and some NGO rep-
resentatives forged strong professional bonds. Unlike other multilateral
negotiation processes, where governmental delegates and NGO representa-
tives are frequently in opposition, the cooperation between the two groups
at the Conference was optimal. Also, the fact that the same participants
met for thirteen weeks in New York, three weeks in Siracusa, and two weeks
in Zutphen fostered cooperation and a collegial atmosphere which
advanced the process in spite of differences of opinion.
During the Conference negotiations, a coalition known as the "like-
minded states" became a significant driving force behind the Statute. This
diverse group emerged from the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee and
the PrepCom and ultimately grew to over sixty states.5 ' It was well organ-
ized and its meetings and briefings for smaller'countries were carefully
prepared.
The 238 NGOs at the Conference also played a significant role in dis-
cussing the issues and proposing options to government delegations. The
NGOs had contributed so greatly to the Ad Hoc Committee and the
PrepCom meetings that they were given unprecedented access to meetings
at Rome. Several notable organizations actively lobbied for the tribunal
and provided legal and technical expertise.52 More particularly, the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross made valuable contributions to the
process, especially with respect to the definitions of crimes.
In light of the problems described in the previous section,53 the first
two weeks of the Conference reinforced the skepticism of those who did
not want a successful outcome or who doubted the task could be com-
pleted within twenty-four working days. The delegates who remained after
49. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
51. The "like-minded states" at the Conference included: Australia, Austria, Argen-
tina, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Greece, Gua-
temala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lesotho, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Samoa, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago (rep-
resenting 12 Caricom states), Uruguay, and Venezuela. See THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT, supra note 2, at 25. This group of states has continued to grow since
1998.
52. These organizations included the American Bar Association, Amnesty Interna-
tional, the Association International de Droit PEnal, the Carter Center, the European
Law Students Association, Human Rights Watch, the International Commission of
Jurists, the International Human Rights Law Institute, the International Institute for the
Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, the Lawyers Committee of Human Rights, No Peace
Without Justice, Parliamentarians for Global Action, the Women's Caucus, the World
Federalist Association, and the Washington Working Group on an International Crimi-
nal Court.
53. See supra notes 32-48 and accompanying text.
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the opening ceremonies to hammer out the Draft Statue had varying
degrees of instructions from their respective governments.5 4 While delega-
tions from developed countries typically had detailed, specific instruc-
tions, other delegations had received instructions which varied widely in
their detail and specificity and particularly in the level of discretion
granted to the delegation heads. Most developing countries, based on my
observation, had received fairly vague instructions. The nature of the
instructions sent to the delegates depended on both the size and expertise
of home-based staff. Developed countries generally fielded the larger, bet-
ter-informed delegations. Delegation heads from these countries usually
wielded broad discretionary authority, which allowed them to conduct
more efficient negotiations. Conversely, the delegations of developing
countries were typically smaller and had limited instructions. As a result,
these delegations could not undertake broad negotiations, particularly if
the ultimate result would likely meet with home-front opposition by more
senior officials.
These factors, combined with the fact that many delegations did not
have sufficient time to study the Draft Statute or were otherwise unready
for wide-ranging negotiations, slowed the negotiating process. By July 5,
the delegates' concern over the pace of the negotiating had increased to the
point that the successful outcome of the Conference was genuinely
threatened. The skeptics noted the obvious lack of progress on the major
issues contained in Part 2 and in some of the Final Clauses;55 they also
voiced concern regarding the piecemeal approach to the drafting of the
Statute,5 6 which left most delegates unclear about the Statute as a whole.
57
To forestall a breakdown in negotiations, Kirsch, assisted by the Bureau of
the Committee of the Whole, members of the Canadian delegation, and
some members of the "like-minded states" delegations, produced a Chair-
man's Paper dealing with what he then saw as the major unresolved issues.
Kirsch hoped that the Paper would re-focus the delegates' attention by pro-
viding them with a draft compromise. However, while many delegations
were willing to discuss the Paper, few actively engaged in negotiations with
each other, despite Kirsch's urgings.58
54. Furthermore, "certain delegations were in special or unique circum-
stances .... Italy was to be the host of the Rome conference; the Netherlands was the
undisputed candidate to be the host country for the International Criminal Court." See
Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 24, at 17.
55. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
57. The author was able to see the unfolding picture and keep the Drafting Commit-
tee updated by entering changes in an electronic version of the Draft Statute. Since the
Drafting Committee was dealing with several hundreds of pages of different documents,
this tracking system was accompanied by a parallel chart of the document symbols for
each provision or paragraph. Without this approach, the Drafting Committee would
have drowned in paper.
58. On July 8, "Kirsch opened the Committee of the Whole for a point-by-point dis-
cussion of the ... paper .... [H]e requested at the opening of the session that states
answer a set of precise questions," rather than make general comments. The format
"limited the scope of and length of the answers and forced delegations to be specific,"
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Delegations engaged in a multilateral process usually try to resolve
their differences by extensive negotiations. At the Conference, however,
some delegations adopted inflexible positions either because they did not
have enough instructions or for other specific reasons. In particular, the
United States exhibited greater rigidity than many had expected. Most
delegations, especially those from the "like-minded states," had bent over
backwards to accommodate the United States. For example, the articles
dealing with procedure and with the definition of crimes were substantially
as the United States wanted. When the delegations began to grapple with
such issues as the ICC's jurisdiction and the independent role of the Prose-
cutor, the U.S. delegation, which had previously secured broad concessions
on many points, adopted an unyielding position. Many delegations were
dismayed by this display of diplomatic inflexibility, which was widely
interpreted as another sign of U.S. intransigence and as a weakness in the
U.S. negotiating approach. The U.S. response failed to alleviate these con-
cerns, thus confirming the delegates' negative judgments.5 9 However, it
must be noted that the United States had some valid concerns that were
not sufficiently and dearly articulated, and that these were not addressed
in an imaginative fashion.
By July 12, the gaps between the more active delegations narrowed,
due to the efforts of Kirsch and those working with him. Although the
United States had rejected the proposed compromise package, the other
delegations were growing weary of what they perceived as the U.S. delega-
tion's lack of negotiating flexibility and subtlety.60 Increasingly, the other
delegations felt that it would be better to stop giving in to the United States;
they believed the United States would never be satisfied with the conces-
sions it got and ultimately would never sign the Treaty for completely unre-
lated domestic political reasons. The other delegations therefore decided
to go ahead with Kirsch's proposed compromise package rather than to
have it unravel due to last minute U.S. demands.
VI. The Final Stage
Part 2 of the Draft Statute addressed, inter alia, the definition of crimes, the
Court's jurisdiction and triggering mechanisms, complementarity, the
roles of the Prosecutor and the Security Council, and the prospective appli-
which in turn allowed Kirsch to take a "virtual vote." See Benedetti & Washburn, supra
note 24, at 31.
59. However, the U.S. position was not always clear, probably because of the uncer-
tainty with which the U.S. Administration approached the entire endeavor. This situa-
tion made productive negotiations more difficult than expected. For an insightful
description of the Administration's ambivalent stance, see Ruth Wedgwood, Fiddling in
Rome: America and the International Criminal Court, 6 FOREIGN AFF. 20 (1998).
60. Several other delegations had problems with the proposed compromise package,
and in that respect the United States was not alone. For example, India also rejected the
compromise package, albeit for different reasons that the United States (e.g., India
wanted to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, while the United States fought hard
against most states to keep nuclear weapons permissible). However, the importance of
securing U.S. support guaranteed that its positions would command great attention.
' 57
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cation of the Statute's substantive provisions. In other words, it contained
all of the political issues that had not been fully addressed at the PrepCom.
While the Conference delegates were heavily involved in all of the technical
legal issues, as well as other political issues of a lesser significance, the
weighty issues in Part 2 were left for last minute political compromises.
6 1
By the third week, however, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole
saw the necessity of producing a text identifying those points from the Part
2 issues where agreement had been reached and those where compromise
appeared possible. He and members of the Bureau consulted extensively
for the remaining two weeks of the Conference. On the last day of the
Conference, as stated above, the Bureau presented the Committee of the
Whole with a proposed text for Part 2 on a take it or leave it basis.62 The
Bureau adopted that approach to forestall further discussions by the Com-
mittee of the Whole; at that late stage, additional debate would have meant
the collapse of the Conference. The take it or leave it approach was a calcu-
lated risk, as some delegations could have raised procedural hurdles in the
few remaining hours of the Conference.
The Bureau's proposed text was completed in all six languages at 0200
hours on July 18, while the Conference was officially supposed to end at
1800 hours on July 17, or by midnight at the latest. To allow the delega-
tions to study the text of Part 2, the Committee of the Whole convened after
1800 hours on that last Friday to adopt the Bureau's proposal. Due to the
extraordinary efficiency of the Secretariat and the Conference staff, the text
had already been integrated with the main body of the Statute, which had
been previously adopted by the Committee of the Whole on July 15.63
With the clock approaching midnight, the U.S. and Indian delegations each
sought to introduce last minute amendments to the Part 2 proposal.
64
With respect to each of the two proposed amendments, however, Norway
introduced a no action motion, which is the same as a motion to table. In
response to these motions, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole
acted boldly and decisively, in accord with the rules, by giving precedence
to the no action motions so that the Conference could proceed.
The vote of the no action motion for India's proposal was 114 in favor,
sixteen against and twenty abstentions. The vote on the no action motion
for the U.S. proposal was 113 in favor, seventeen against and twenty-five
61. As some veteran negotiators later said, if the Conference had another week, these
issues would still have been debated on the last week and not before.
62. See supra note 45.
63. For reasons stated above, Part 2 (Articles 5 to 21) was not referred to the Draft-
ing Committee like other parts of the Draft Statute.
64. India, for example, wanted to limit the role of the Security Council (a change
most delegations opposed), and include nuclear weapons among prohibited weapons (a
change most developing countries supported). The United States primarily wanted
jurisdiction to be subject to the consent of the state of nationality of the prospective
defendant but that was opposed by most states. India and the United States also wanted
to limit the scope of Article 12 affecting non-State Parties. See supra note 46 and accom-
panying text-
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abstentions. After this second vote, 65 the delegates burst into a spontane-
ous standing ovation, which turned into rhythmic applause that lasted
close to ten minutes. Some delegates embraced one another, and others
had tears in their eyes. It was one of the most extraordinary emotional
scenes ever to take place at a diplomatic conference. The prevailing feeling
was that the long journey that had started after World War I had finally
reached its destination. This historic moment was of great significance for
everyone who had struggled to establish the ICC. But it was also a moment
of release from the tensions and pressures of the previous five weeks of
intensive work.
66
The Committee of the Whole adjourned at about 2100 hours; shortly
thereafter the Plenary convened for its final session. This was to be a quick
formal session, but to everyone's surprise, the United States asked for
another vote. 67 This time 120 delegations voted for the adoption of the
Statute and the Final Act of the Conference, 68 and for the opening of the
Convention for signature on the next day; only seven voted against6 9 and
65. See Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/C.1/
L.76; A/Conf.183/C.I/L.76/Add.1-Add.14 (1998).
66. Some observers interpreted the elation of the delegates as anti-American, but
that is exaggerated. The delegates were genuinely happy to have completed this historic
task which, coupled with the release of tensions after a long and arduous process, pro-
duced a sense of euphoria. To be sure, there was also a sense of "enough is enough"
with what was perceived as U.S. evasiveness or intransigence. But on the whole the
atmosphere was celebratory, not anti-American. After all, the United States had won
many significant concessions during the negotiations. The concessions the United
States failed to achieve would have severely hampered the ICC's ultimate purpose; more-
over, these requests were perceived as motivated by domestic U.S. politics and thus gar-
nered little sympathy from the other delegations. The United States, however, had valid
concerns such as the problem with Article 12(3), see supra note 46. It also had a valid
concern with another non-State Party issue contained in Article 121, which gave acced-
ing Parties the right to not accept the Court's jurisdiction for additional crimes adopted
by the Assembly of State Parties. See Article 121(5) ("Any amendment to article 5 of this
Statute shall enter into force for those State Parties which have accepted the amendment
one year after the deposit of their instruments or ratification or acceptance. In respect of
a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its
jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State
Party's nationals or on its territory."). Lastly, the United States had valid concerns with
the absence of a road-map and legal standards for complementarity and for the Prosecu-
tor's proprio motu actions. See Article 15(1) (explaining that the Prosecutor may initiate
investigations proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court). These concerns could have been addressed in Rome with more time, and
with dearer U.S. positions on these issues.
67. This was an unrecorded vote, presumably designed to encourage some States to
vote against the Statute.
68. See Rome Statute, supra note 2. As a result of the limited time available between
the adoption of the Statute and the Treaty's opening for signature ceremony, the Stat-
ute's text required a few corrections. Substantive corrections were made to Article 8,
paragraph 4; Article 121, paragraph 5; and Article 124. For non-substantive errors, the
Department of Legal Affairs instituted a "no objection" procedure. See supra note 41.
69. Regrettably, the United States, China and India did not join in the vote for the
establishment of the ICC, and because of the importance of these states, it is hoped that
they will see fit to join at a later date. The preparatory commission established by the
General Assembly (based on the Conference's resolution contained in Annex I, F of the
Final Act) may be the vehicle through which these major governments and others could
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twenty-one abstained. This overwhelmingly positive vote was followed by
some delegations' explanation of their vote as well as general statements by
some delegations. The post-vote statements extended past 0200 hours the
following day. However, the clock was figuratively stopped at one minute
before midnight so that the Plenary could be said to have completed its
work within the General Assembly's mandate, which provided that the
Conference should end on July 17.
VII. Legal Methods and Techniques
Multilateral treaty negotiation processes differ from the manner in which
states undertake to elaborate and adopt legislation. The former is essen-
tially a political process, while the latter is essentially a technical one,
though of course subject to political considerations. Multilateral treaty
negotiations are conducted mostly by diplomats, not by legal technicians
with expertise in the subject at hand. The rules and practices of multilat-
eral treaty negotiations are shaped by years of diplomatic practice, and
conditioned by international, regional, and domestic political concerns.
Above all, the techniques employed in international and national processes
are quite different.70
The delegates who negotiated the Draft Statute came from various
legal systems and traditions. Many were diplomats who lacked expertise in
international criminal law, comparative criminal law, or comparative crim-
inal procedure. Most delegates had no criminal practice experience of any
kind. In addition, the composition of the working groups changed on a
daily basis, except for a core number of constant delegates, who came from
larger delegations that could afford to assign delegates to specific groups
for the duration of the work, or from smaller delegations that had a specific
interest in a given area.
Generally, experienced veterans of the Ad Hoc Committee and the
PrepCom acted as coordinators for the working groups. Throughout the
drafting process, the delegates primarily aimed to achieve agreement, even
at the cost of a consistent and coherent legal method. Any comparatist can
attest to the difficulty of reconciling different legal systems, and any jurist
can attest to the difficulty of uniform legal drafting. The combination of
these two objective difficulties created a significant challenge. On the
whole and in light of the aforementioned challenges in Rome, the text pro-
explore possibilities of finding solutions to their concerns. For other states voting
against the Statute, see Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 24, at 27 (noting that "the
U.S. delegation found itself, according to the records of most observers, dissenting in the
company of the delegations of Israel, China, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Qatar.").
70. Complex national legislation is frequently prepared by legislative experts who
also benefit from the advice and expertise of consultants outside of the legislative pro-
cess. Bar Associations and professional groups also frequently provide their input.
These processes often take a long time, thus giving an opportunity for reflection and
deliberation. In contrast, the history of ICC reveals how few experts work on even a
complex statute, how little time is available at a diplomatic conference, and how haphaz-
ard that process can be.
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duced is exceptionally good.71 Some parts of the Statute, however, posed
particularly complex problems.72 The following observations illustrate
some of the problem areas and their resolutions.
Part 2 of the Draft Statute contains, inter alia, the definition of
crimes.73 Defining the crime of genocide (Article 6) presented no problem
since the delegates adopted almost verbatim the definition from the 1948
Genocide Convention.74 As a result, the Statute's definition of genocide
shares the same gaps in the protected categories of victims as does the
Convention. 75 In contrast, the Statute's definition of crimes against
humanity (Article 7) substantially expands the original definition con-
tained in the Nuirnberg Charter's Article 6(C), 7 6 and also from Article 5 of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 77
and Article 3 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).78
Article 7's language is substantially clear, although some of the prohibited
acts are mere labels 79 whose elements will need to be established in the
71. The Secretariat also contributed significantly to the negotiating process,
although its role is not widely known beyond those few insiders who helped assemble
the text. The members of the Secretariat worked efficiently and indefatigably. During
the last week of the Conference, many of them slept only a few hours a day, with some
working almost around the clock in the final three days. Their extraordinary contribu-
tion should not be overlooked by posterity. They are: Hans Corell, Under-Secretary-
General and Legal Counsel; Roy Lee, Director of the Codification Division of the Office
of Legal Affairs and the Conference's Executive Secretary; Manuel Rama-Montaldo, Sec-
retary, Drafting Committee; Mahnoush Arsanjani, Secretary, Committee of the Whole;
Mpazi Sinjela, Secretary, Credentials Committee; and Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas,
Virginia Morris, Vladimir Rudnitsky and Renan Villacis, Assistant Secretaries of the
Conference.
72. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, A/Conf.183/2/Add.1, July 17, 1998, reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note 2, at 119-210.
73. See supra note 43 for other Part 2 topics.
74. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 8,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, reprinted in 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 7 (1951) (Supp.).
75. Article 2 of Genocide Convention refers only to "national, ethnic or religious"
groups. It does not include social or political ones. The delegates chose to not expand
the Genocide Convention's definition since doing so might have required states to revise
their laws implementing that Convention. Despite the strong urging of this writer, the
delegates unfortunately lost a historic opportunity to fill these unjustified gaps.
76. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of London Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 299, E.A.S.
742. See also M. CHERIF BAssiouri, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAv (2d rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter BAssioum, CRIMEs AGAINST HUMANITY].
77. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), S.C. Res.
808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993). See also M.
CHERIF BAssIOumN (in collaboration with PETER MANUCAs), THE LAw OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1996).
78. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). See also VIRGINIA Momus
& MIcHAEL P. ScHARF, AN INSIDER's GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA (1997).
79. The drafters were under pressure from different sources to include certain pro-
hibited acts in the Statute, but they did not draft specific elements which would have
required lengthy and complicated sub-paragraphs. There was no time to engage in such
detailed technical legal drafting.
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future, thus raising questions about their conformity to the requirements of
the principles of legality contained in Article 22. Furthermore, the juris-
dictional element of policy is characterized as acts that are "widespread or
systematic."80 This is not the clearest definition of policy.,, The drafters
may have been uncertain, but more likely the lack of clarity was intentional
- it provided a diplomatic way around NGO pressure to transform crimes
against humanity into a crime encompassing massive human rights viola-
tions whether or not it was pursuant to state or organizational (which
encompasses non-state actors) policy.
82
Article 8, which deals with war crimes, was the most difficult article to
draft. In large part, the drafting problems for this article can be traced to
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France - all of whom were
concerned that their military personnel could be charged with war crimes
as a result of their activities in peace-keeping operations. The drafters
opted to subdivide Article 8 into segments reflecting different sources of
law applicable to different contexts. However, as Article 8 reflects, the con-
ventional and customary law of armed conflicts is neither evenly balanced
nor sufficiently clear, particularly in regard to both international and non-
international conflicts and to prohibited weapons.
Paragraph 2 of Article 8 deals with "grave breaches" of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, which solely apply to international conflicts. Since
Paragraph 2 was taken verbatim from these Conventions, it poses no
problems of specificity. But other paragraphs in Article 8 encompass viola-
tions of the laws and customs of war arising in both international and non-
international conflicts.8 3 Moreover, unlike conventional law violations, the
customary law violations set out in Article 8 are open to interpretation,
particularly with respect to prohibited weapons and weapons of mass
destruction.
Between the objective uncertainty of customary law and the desires of
certain delegations for built-in ambiguities, Article 8 is an unwieldy and, in
part, an unclear provision. Article 8 also contains different inconsistent
terms referring to the mental element, but the reconciliation of these terms
with the provisions contained in Part 3 on the mental element was not
80. The required element of policy (i.e., state action) distinguishes crimes against
humanity from other mass human rights violations and establishes its status as a cate-
gory of international crimes. See BAssiOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HuMAn, supra note 76, at
246-49. The element of policy also applies to non-State actors, which is not clear in
Article 7(1) and 7(2). Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. For example, Article 8(b) reflects the provisions of Common Article 3 of the
1949 Geneva Conventions and some provisions of Protocol (II) Additional to Geneva
Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-Interna-
tional Conflicts, opened for signature, Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144/Annex II
(1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, both of which apply to international conflicts. Some
provisions of Protocol (I) Additional to Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, opened for signature, Dec. 12,
1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144/Annex I (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, also apply to
international conflicts.
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made. Moreover, there is no clear connection between the exceptions,
exclusions, and defenses contained in Article 8 and the defenses contained
in Part 3. The repeated use of the term "unlawful" as a qualifier for certain
military acts in Article 8 will foster yet more confusion. The question will
surely arise as to what is meant by that term since most legal systems
define unlawfulness in a specific prohibitory norm. It is unclear where
that norm exists with respect to conduct that can be characterized as
unlawful, and how the legal source of the unlawfulness and its applicability
in a given case is to be determined. Furthermore, characterizing certain
conduct as unlawful also involves the mental element of knowledge. The
absence of knowledge negates criminal responsibility, and certain mis-
takes of law or fact affecting knowledge constitute legal defenses. But, since
there is no clear indication of what legal source to rely upon for determin-
ing unlawfulness, Part 3 alone cannot solve all of these problems. Certain
delegations probably intended this ambiguity, but other delegations were
not alerted to it. Moreover, the members of the working group on Part 3
and those of Article 8 worked separately, and these texts were never recon-
ciled. The Committee never reviewed Article 8, which fell within Part 2; as
stated above, Part 2 went directly to a vote by the Committee of the Whole
on July 17 without the possibility of discussion of amendments.
The overlap in the elements defining genocide, crimes against human-
ity, and war crimes in Articles 6, 7, and 8 will also foster serious problems
in interpreting the Statute.84 Several factors underlie this oversight, includ-
ing the drafters' immediate concern to produce an acceptable compromise
text (which necessitated dispensing with legal technicalities), and the inex-
perience of the informal working group dealing with these Articles.
Part 3 (General Principles of Criminal Responsibility) raised the
deeper problem of reconciling different legal conceptions.8 5 Part 3 is the
most technically difficult part of the Statute and is the most likely to be
criticized by comparative criminal law experts. 8 6 In particular, the lack of
any limitations on affirmative defenses such as insanity, intoxication, mis-
take of law, and mistake of fact (insofar as they are available in the context
84. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Normative Framework of International Humanitarian
Law: Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNuMjP. PROBS. 199 (1998).
Interpretation problems arising from the overlap have already surfaced in connection
with the ICTR's Akayesu case, The Prosecutor vs. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-
T. In the French legal system and other Civilist/Romanist legal systems, this problem is
referred to as concours ideal d'infractions (the ideal concurrence of crimes). When sev-
eral crimes have overlapping legal elements, the judge has difficulty establishing which
crime was committed. Presumably, the Preparatory Commission established under Res-
olution F of the Final Act pursuant to Article 9 will resolve some of these issues.
85. This writer faced this problem when developing a "general part" of international
criminal law. See M. CHERIF BASsIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND A
DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987) [hereinafter DRAFT
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE]. For additional information on Part 3, see William A.
Schabas, General Principles of Criminal Law in the International Criminal Court Statute
(Part III), 6 EuR. J. CRIME, CRIM. LD & CRIM. JusT. 84-112 (1998).
86. See various authors in 67 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PtNAL (1996), comment-
ing on DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 84.
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of genocide and crimes against humanity) will seem incongruous to many.
Under the current form of these affirmative defenses, a head of state could
claim that he or she issued an order to commit genocide while intoxicated
and should therefore be exonerated of criminal responsibility. The drafters
surely did not intend to allow those who order, command, or execute such
crimes as genocide and crimes against humanity to assert these affirmative
defenses, but they should have clearly stated their intent instead of leaving
it open to judicial interpretation.
Another shortcoming of the Statute involves determining the mental
element required for each of the crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction. The
drafters failed in some instances to clearly delineate the requisite intent
(i.e., specific or general) for crimes, or to distinguish those who order the
commission of crimes from those who execute them.8 7 These problems are
especially evident in Article 8, where there is some confusion regarding
when a given war crime requires specific or general intent. The Statute also
does not specify which legal standards should be used to establish intent.
Because common law, civil law, and other legal systems approach the
mental element of crimes very differently, the drafters of Part 3 faced a
significant challenge. While the drafters resolved some of the differences,
in the interest of diplomatic compromise they left many others for ICC
jurisprudence to settle. Part 3 thus contains many ambiguities relating to
elements of crimes, especially because it does not include a provision on
actus reus, which was dropped because the working group could not reach
a consensus on the meaning and application of omissions as a basis for the
material element.
To improve the situation concerning Part 3 and the definition of
crimes contained in Articles 6, 7, and 8, Article 9 of the Statute requires the
PrepCom to draft a set of non-binding elements of crimes to serve as future
guidelines. 8 However, it is difficult to foresee how the judges of the Court
will interpret these non-binding elements in light of the binding legal
nature of the Statute's norms and other sources of interpretation.8 9 This
post hoc drafting of elements of crimes, while valid in international law, is
anomalous in criminal law. Nevertheless, the drafters included Article 9 to
try to balance the competing demands of diplomacy and specificity in
criminal legislation.
Parts 4, 5, and 6 (dealing with procedure) present a veritable conglom-
eration of different legal processes, although the adversary-accusatorial
process prevails in substance as well as in numerous specific provisions.
The decision to develop detailed adversary-accusatorial norms and rules
(with a few norms deriving from the so-called inquisitorial systems) was
87. See BAssIoum, CRIMES AGAINST HuMANIrrY, supra note 76.
88. See Res. F of the Final Act at paragraph 5(b) ("The Commission shall prepare
proposals for practical arrangements for the establishment and coming into operation of
the Court, including the draft texts of ... Elements of Crimes.").
89. Article 21 of the Statute permits recourse to alternative legal sources of interna-
tional law. That very norm, however, may pose problems in light of Article 22, which
clearly states the applicability of the principle nullum crimen sine lege.
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motivated by a desire to protect the rights of the accused, though some
delegates, including myself, felt that excessive formalism would ultimately
be counter-productive to the accused and would certainly delay the
processes of investigation, prosecution, and adjudication. 90 Trials that are
excessively long due to procedural reasons would, in my opinion, not only
delay justice, but also negatively impact public support for the Court, par-
ticularly as costs arising from extended procedures skyrocket. Both the
U.S. and the U.K. delegations insisted on the inclusion of those norms,
over the objections of some other delegations. 91 It is not certain whether
the drafters envisioned the formalistic impact of these detailed procedures
on the effectiveness of the ICC's processes. 92 They did intend, however, to
curtail the ability of the Court to enact rules of procedure, as is the case
with the ICTY9 3 and ICTR.
9 4
Part 7 (Penalties) may also raised questions with jurists who inter-
preted the principle of nulla poene sine lege more rigidly.95 This part was
extensively negotiated and represents a compromise between many seem-
ingly irreconcilable positions. For example, the NGO community pushed
strongly for some recognition of victims' rights and compensation, just as
it had during the formation of the ICTY. In the latter instance, the Security
Council paid only lip-service to the question of victim compensation and
included a paragraph about it in Resolution 827.96 Because international
law is far from settled on the question of victims' rights, the drafters opted
to not clearly delineate the substantive and procedural aspects of those
rights in Articles 75 and 79.97 The resulting provisions would not satisfy
most legal codifications.
90. However, as illustrated by the work of the Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), this approach may not necessarily
benefit the accused in connection with gathering evidence. See Final Report of the Com-
mission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. 5/1994/674 (1994); Annexes to the Final Report,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2 (1994); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780: Investigat-
ing Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CuM. L.F.
279 (1994). Representatives of the ICTY repeatedly pointed out the practical problems
they faced when they appeared before the PrepCom, but their concerns about effective-
ness and operational questions were not sufficiently heeded.
91. For example, the French delegation repeatedly sought to introduce an alternate
approach but ultimately acquiesced to the U.S. and U.K. position.
92. While many delegates questioned the necessity of such detail, that was one of
the concessions granted to the U.S. delegation. In the future, however, such an approach
will likely encumber the Court with procedural hurdles. Consequently, the effectiveness
of ICC may suffer and its proceedings are likely to be lengthy and procedurally
contentious.
93. See S.C. Res. 808, supra note 77.
94. See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 78, art. 14.
95. See supra note 89.
96. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES 827 (1993).
97. See,; e.g., Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985); Study Con-
cerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation, and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Vio-
lations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Final Report submitted by Mr. Theo
Van Boven, Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
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Part 9 (Cooperation) also reflects a delicate compromise and conse-
quently treats the legal nature of the obligations it requires ambiguously.
98
A link to complementarity would have helped overcome the possibility that
some governments would assert the supremacy of national legal norms
concerning surrender and other forms of penal cooperation over the
norms of the Statute.99 But precisely these tensions between what could
have been deemed a supra-national rather than an international process
produced the more ambiguous compromise approach.
Commentators on the Rome Statute will surely find much to criticize
in the method and technique (or lack thereof) of the drafters. Nevertheless,
the Rome Statute text is not likely to be amended easily, if for no other
reason than any amendments would require another lengthy process of rat-
ification. As the Court develops its own jurisprudence, it should address
many of the Statute's flaws. The Assembly of State Parties can also remedy
some of these problems. That expectation is in itself a legal technique in
addressing difficult questions, and it would surely be valid, provided that it
can be reconnected with Article 22 (Nullum crimen sine lege).100
A more immediate problem, however, is how states wanting to ratify
1993/8 (1993); Revised Set of Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to Reparation
for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, prepared by Mr.
Theo Van Boven pursuant to Sub-Commission decision 1995/117, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1996/17 (1996); Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subject to Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/104; Report of the Independent
Expert on the Right to Restitution, Compensation, and Rehabilitation for Victims of Grave
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, submitted by Mr. M. Cherif Bas-
siouni pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1998/43, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1999/65 (1999).
98. See, e.g., 2 INrERNATioNAL CRIMINAL LAw (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
99. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Observations Concerning the 1997-98 Preparatory Com-
mittee's Work, in 13 NEP, supra note 2, at 12-13; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Observations on the
Structure of the (Zutphen) Consolidated Text, in 13bis NEP, supra note 2, at 8-9, 11-16.
100. It should be noted that Article 21, "Applicable Law," states:
1. The Court shall apply:
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the prin-
ciples and rules of international law, including the established princi-
ples of the international law of armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from
national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the
national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over
the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this
Statute and with international law and internationally recognized
norms and standards.
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previ-
ous decisions.
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be
consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any
adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender, as defined in article
7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 21. This Article may well appear to be in contradiction
with a rigid interpretation of Article 22, which adopts the principle of nullum crimen sine
lege.
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the Treaty will develop national implementing legislation. 10 1 Since states
will develop such legislation based on their respective national legal sys-
tems, the resulting legislation will differ widely. Consequently, the ICC
and those who will have to work with this Statute will have to grapple with
a wide-range of different legal issues arising from not only the problems of
the Statute, the Elements of Crimes, and Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
but also the different types of national implementing legislation.
Some of these difficulties might have been avoided by having more
delegates with expertise in international and comparative criminal law and
procedure in national delegations, as well as by allowing more time for the
drafting process. 10 2 Nevertheless, some problems were inevitable since the
drafting process itself suffered from the flaws of multilateral negotiating
practices. 10 3 The drafting process was too vulnerable to the obstinacy of
single delegations or even single delegates who refused to allow approval
by consensus. There has to be a better way to draft such complex multilat-
eral treaties.
Conclusion
On July 18, the Convention was opened for signature at I1 Campidoglio in
Rome. In order to permit the Secretariat and the translators to finalize the
text, the ceremony started at 1600 hours. Within two hours, twenty-six
governments had signed the Treaty, which remained available for signature
in Rome at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs until October 30, 1998.
Thereafter, the Treaty was transferred to its depository with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations at New York Headquarters. By the end of
October 1999, eighty-nine states had signed and four states had ratified the
Treaty.10 4 In the interim, the General Assembly established the Prepara-
tory Commission to prepare the way for the Court to function as soon as
the Treaty entered into force.105 The Preparatory Commission's first ses-
101. See l3qatar NOUVELLES ETUDES PtNALES (1999).
102. The five-week period (with 24 working days) was negotiated between the U.N.
Office of Legal Affairs and the Italian Government. Cost factors largely determined the
period of time and the number of U.N. personnel at the Conference.
103. See supra notes 32-48 and accompanying text for a description of problems in
the drafting process of the ICC Statute.
104. See supra note 13.
105. See Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (1998), at
Annex I (F). The Preparatory Commission's duties included the preparation of
proposals for practical arrangements for the establishment and coming into
operation of the Court, including the draft texts of:
(a) Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
(b) Elements of Crimes;
(c) A relationship agreement between the Court and the United Nations;
(d) Basic principles governing a headquarters agreement to be negotiated
between the Court and the host country;
(e) Financial regulations and rules;
(f) An agreement on the privileges and immunities of the Court;
(g) A budget for the first financial year;
(h) The rules of procedure of the Assembly of States Parties.
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sion took place in New York in February 1999, the second session occurred
in July 1999, and its third session will be held in November 1999.
This writer's speech at the Rome Ceremony on July 18, which follows,
expresses the moral, ethical and policy significance of this historical
journey.
10 6
The world will never be the same after the establishment of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. Yesterday's adoption of the Final Act of the United
Nations Diplomatic Conference and today's opening of the Convention for
signature marks both the end of a historical process that started after World
War I as well as the beginning of a new phase in the history of international
criminal justice. The establishment of the ICC symbolizes and embodies
certain fundamental values and expectations shared by all peoples of the
world and is, therefore, a triumph for all peoples of the world.
The ICC reminds governments that realpolitik, which sacrifices justice
at the altar of political settlements, is no longer accepted. It asserts that
impunity for the perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes is no longer tolerated. In that respect it fulfils what Prophet Moham-
mad said, that "wrongs must be righted." It affirms that justice is an integral
part of peace and thus reflects what Pope Paul VI once said, "If you want
The Commission is also charged to prepare a draft provision for the crime of aggression.
106. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Speech at Rome Ceremony (July 18, 1998). In that speech I
refer to the few to which so many owe their thanks. Among those who were delegates
and who merit special recognition for their commitment, hard work and dedication to
the success of this endeavor are: Frangois Alabrune, France; Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein,
Jordan; Hans-Joerg Behrens, Germany; Franklin Berman, United Kingdom; Trevor
Chimimba, Malawi; Jamison S. Borek, United States; Adriaan Bos, The Netherlands;
Lucius Caflisch, Switzerland; Delia Chatoor, Trinidad and Tobago; Roger Clark, Samoa;
Harvey Dalton, United States; Phani Daskalopoulou-Livada, Greece; Susan J. Dickson,
United Kingdom; Paula Escarameia, Portugal; Sylvia Alejandra Ferandez de Gurmendi,
Argentina; Rolf Einar Fife, Norway; Charles Garraway, United Kingdom; Fabricio
Guariglia, Argentina; Gerhard Hafner, Austria; John Holmes, Canada; Mark B. Jennings,
Australia; Hans-Peter Kaul, Germany; Philippe Kirsch, Canada; Erkki Kourula, Finland;
Sung-Kyu Lee, Korea; Beatrice Le Fraper du Hellen, France; Lamia Mekheimer, Egypt;
Phakiso Mochochoko, Lesotho; Christopher Muttukumaru, United Kingdom; Yasumasa
Nagamine, Japan; Hisashi Owada, Japan; Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, France, Donald
Piragoff, Canada; Mauro Politi, Italy; Rama Rao, India; Medard R. Rwelamira, South
Africa; Waleed Sadi, Jordan; Per Saland, Sweden; David Scheffer, United States; Joanna
Scott, France; Cathrine Lisa Steans, Australia; Peter Tomka, Slovakia, Peter Vallance,
United Kingdom; Hermann Von Hebel, The Netherlands; Mary Ellen Warlow, United
States; Elizabeth Wilmhurst, United Kingdom; Felicity Wong, New Zealand; and Lionel
Yee, Singapore.
The responsibility for the Conference rested on the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and more particularly on Ambassador Umberto Vattani, Secretary-General of the Minis-
try; Professor Umberto Leanza, Director of Legal Affairs and his Deputy Counselor,
Umberto Colesanti; and at the Italian Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Fran-
cesco Paolo Fulci and Professor Mauro Politi. Last, but not least, is Professor Giovanni
Conso, Former Minister of Justice and Honorary President of the Constitutional Court,
who was the President of the Conference.
Many academics have worked for the establishment of the ICC and their scholarly
work made it possible for the idea to gain international recognition and national
support.
As with all such developments, it takes dedicated, knowledgeable and capable persons
to transform ideals into reality.
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peace, work for justice." These values are clearly reflected in the ICC's
Preamble.
The ICC will not be a panacea for all the ills of humankind. It will not
eliminate conflicts, nor return victims to life, or restore survivors to their
prior conditions of well-being and it will not bring all perpetrators of major
crimes to justice. But it can help avoid some conflicts, prevent some victimi-
zation, and bring to justice some of the perpetrators of these crimes. In so
doing, the ICC will strengthen world order and contribute to world peace
and security. As such, the ICC, like other international and national legal
institutions, will add its contribution to the humanization of our civilization.
The ICC also symbolizes human solidarity, for as John Donne so elo-
quently stated, "No man is an island, entire of itself; each man is a piece of
the continent, a part of the main ...Any man's death diminishes me
because I am involved in mankind."
Lastly, the ICC will remind us not to forget these terrible crimes so that
we can heed the admonishment so aptly recorded by George Santayana, that
those who forget the lessons of the past are condemned to repeat their
mistakes.
Ultimately, if the ICC saves but one life, as it is said in the Talmud, it
will be as if it saved the whole of humanity.
From Versailles to Rwanda, and now to the Treaty of Rome, many have
arduously labored for the establishment of a system of international criminal
justice. Today our generation proudly, yet humbly, passes that torch on to
future generations. Thus, the long relay of history goes on, with each gener-
ation incrementally adding on to the accomplishments of its predecessors.
But today, I can say to those who brought about this historic result, the
government delegates in Rome, those who preceded them in New York since
1995, the United Nations staff, members of the Legal Office, the non-govern-
mental organizations and here in Rome the staff of the Italian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, what Winston Churchill once said about heroes of another
time, "never have so many, owed so much, to so few."

